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The Capital Myth 
The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars 
Jagdish Bhagwati 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, the mainstream view that domi 
nates policy circles, indeed the prevalent 
myth, is that despite the striking evidence 
of the inherently crisis-prone nature of 
freer capital movements, a world of full 
capital mobility continues to be inevitable 
and immensely desirable. Instead of 
maintaining careful restrictions, we are 
told, the only sensible course is to continue 
working toward unfettered capital flows; 
the favored solution is to turn the imf 
even more firmly into an international 
lender of last resort that dispenses bailout 
funds to crisis-afflicted countries. The 
imf took an important step in this direction 
at its annual meeting in Hong Kong last 
September, when the Interim Committee 
issued a statement virtually endorsing 
an eventual move to capital account 
convertibility?which means that you 
and I, nationals or foreigners, could take 
capital in and out freely, in any volume 
and at any time?for imf members. The 
obligations originally listed in 1944 in 
the Articles of Agreement, on the other 
hand, included only "avoidance of restric 
tions on payments for current transactions" 
and did not embrace capital account con 
vertibility as an obligation or even a goal. 
This is a seductive idea: freeing up trade 
is good, why not also let capital move freely 
across borders? But the claims of enormous 
benefits from free capital mobility are not 
persuasive. Substantial gains have been 
asserted, not demonstrated, and most of 
the payoff can be obtained by direct equity 
investment. And even a richer imf with 
attendant changes in its methods of opera 
tion will probably not rule out crises or re 
duce their costs significantly. The myth to 
the contrary has been created by what one 
might christen the Wall Street-Treasury 
complex, following in the footsteps of 
President Eisenhower, who had warned 
of the military-industrial complex. 
CAPITAL MOBILITY IDEOLOGY 
Until the Asian crisis sensitized the public 
to the reality that capital movements 
could 
repeatedly generate crises, many 
assumed that free capital mobility among 
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all nations was exactly like free trade in 
their goods and services, a mutual-gain 
phenomenon. Hence restricted capital 
mobility, just like protectionism, was seen 
to be harmfiil to economic performance in 
each country, whether rich or poor. That 
the gains might be problematic because of 
the cost of crises was not considered. 
However, the Asian crisis cannot be 
separated from the excessive borrowings 
of foreign short-term capital as Asian 
economies loosened up their capital 
account controls and enabled their banks 
and firms to borrow abroad. In 1996, total 
private capital inflows to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and 
the Philippines were $93 billion, up from 
$41 billion in 1994. In 1997, that suddenly 
changed to an outflow of $12 billion. Hence 
it has become apparent that crises attendant 
on 
capital mobility cannot be ignored. 
Although it is conceded that this 
downside exists, many claim that it can 
be ameliorated, if not eliminated, and that 
free capital mobility s immense advantages 
can be enjoyed by all. Conservatives would 
do this by letting the markets rip, untended 
by the imf, which could then be sidelined 
or even disbanded. Liberals would do it 
instead by turning the imf into the world s 
lender of last resort, dispensing funds dur 
ing crises with several sorts of conditions, 
and overseeing, buttressing, and managing 
the world of free capital mobility. 
To understand why neither of these 
modifications is enough, it is necessary 
to understand why the original version of 
the myth, which has steadily propelled 
the imf into its complacent and dangerous 
moves toward the goal of capital account 
convertibility, was just that. True, econ 
omists properly say that there is a corre 
spondence between free trade in goods 
and services and free 
capital mobility: 
interfering with either will produce 
efficiency losses. But only an untutored 
economist will argue that, therefore, free 
trade in widgets and life insurance policies 
is the same as free capital mobility. Capital 
flows are characterized, as the economic 
historian Charles Kindleberger of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
has famously noted, by panics and manias. 
Each time a crisis related to capital 
inflows hits a country, it typically goes 
through the wringer. The debt crisis of 
the 1980s cost South America a decade of 
growth. The Mexicans, who were vastly 
overexposed through short-term inflows, 
were devastated in 1994. The Asian 
economies of Thailand, Indonesia, and 
South Korea, all heavily burdened with 
short-term debt, went into a tailspin nearly 
a year ago, drastically lowering their growth 
rates. Sure enough, serious economic 
downturns and crises can arise even when 
governments are not particularly vulnerable 
due to short-term borrowing: macroeco 
nomic mismanagement in Japan has re 
strained its growth rate for nearly seven 
years now, and Japan is still a net lender of 
capital. But it is a non sequitur to suggest, 
as the defenders of free capital mobility do, 
that this possibility somehow negates the 
fact that short-term borrowings under free 
capital mobility will be, and have been, a 
source of considerable economic difficulty. 
DOWNSIZING GAINS 
When a crisis hits, the downside of free 
capital mobility arises. To ensure that capi 
tal returns, the country must do everything 
it can to restore the confidence of those 
who have taken their money out. This typi 
cally means raising interest rates, as the imf 
has required of Indonesia. Across Asia this 
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has decimated firms with large amounts of 
debt. It also means having to sell domestic 
assets, which are greatly undervalued be 
cause of the credit crunch, in a fire sale to 
foreign buyers with better access to funds. 
(Economists have usually advised the exact 
opposite in such depressed circumstances: 
restricting foreign access to a country s as 
sets when its credit, but not that of others, 
has dried up.) Thus, Thailand and South 
Korea have been forced to further open 
their capital markets, even though the 
short-term capital inflow played a princi 
pal role in their troubles in the first place. 
Besides suffering these economic set 
backs, these countries have lost the political 
independence to run their economic 
policies as they deem fit. That their inde 
pendence is lost not directly to foreign 
nations but to an imf increasingly extend 
ing its agenda, at the behest of the U.S. 
Congress, to invade domestic policies on 
matters of social policy?as with the 1994 
Sanders-Frank Amendment, which seeks 
to attach labor standards conditions to 
any increase in bailout funds?is small 
consolation indeed. 
Thus, any nation contemplating the 
embrace of free capital mobility must 
reckon with these costs and also consider 
the probability of running into a crisis. 
The gains from economic efficiency that 
would flow from free capital mobility, in 
a hypothetical crisis-free world, must be 
set 
against this loss if a wise decision is 
to be made. 
None of the proponents of free capital 
mobility have estimated the size of the 
gains they expect to materialize, even 
leaving out the losses from crises that can 
ensue. For free trade, numerous studies 
have measured the costs of protection. 
The overwhelming majority of trade 
economists judge the gains from free 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June i998 [9] 
This content downloaded  on Wed, 23 Jan 2013 15:40:46 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jagdish Bhagwati 
trade to be significant, coming down 
somewhere between Paul Krugmans view 
that they are too small to be taken seriously 
and Jeffrey Sachs' view that they are huge 
and cannot be ignored. But all we have 
from the proponents of capital mobility is 
banner-waving, such as that of Bradford 
De Long, the Berkeley economist and for 
mer deputy assistant secretary for economic 
policy in the Clinton administration: 
So now we have all the benefits of free 
flows of international capital. These 
benefits are mammoth: the ability to 
borrow abroad kept the Reagan deficits 
from crushing U.S. growth like an egg, 
and the ability to borrow from abroad 
has enabled successful emerging market 
economies to double or triple the speed at 
which their productivity levels and living 
standards converge to the industrial core. 
And of Roger C. Altman, the invest 
ment banker, who served in the Treasury 
Department under Presidents Clinton 
and Carter: 
The worldwide elimination of barriers 
to trade and capital... have created the 
global financial marketplace, which 
informed observers hailed for bringing 
private capital to the developing 
world, encouraging economic growth 
and democracy.1 
These assertions assume that free 
capital mobility is enormously beneficial 
while simultaneously failing to evaluate 
its 
crisis-prone downside. But even a 
cursory glance at history suggests that 
these gains may be negligible. After all, 
China and Japan, different in politics and 
sociology as well as historical experience, 
have registered remarkable growth rates 
without capital account convertibility. 
Western Europe's return to prosperity 
was also achieved without capital account 
convertibility. Except for Switzerland, 
capital account liberalization was pretty 
slow at the outset and did not gain strength 
until the late 1980s, and some European 
countries, among them Portugal and 
Ireland, did not implement it until the 
early 1990s. 
Besides, even if one believes that 
capital flows are greatly productive, there 
is still an important difference between 
embracing free portfolio capital mobility 
and having a policy of attracting direct 
equity investment. Maybe the amount of 
direct foreign investment that a country 
attracts will be reduced somewhat by not 
having freedom of portfolio capital flows, 
but there is little evidence for this assertion. 
Even then such a loss would be a small 
fraction of the gains from having a 
pro-foreign investment strategy. 
A WALL STREET-TREASURY COMPLEX 
That brings us to the myth that crises 
under capital account convertibility can 
be eliminated. We have, of course, heard 
this assertion before as each crisis has 
been confronted, and then we have been 
hit by yet another one. Like cats, crises 
have many lives, and macroeconomists, 
never a tribe that enjoyed a great reputa 
tion for getting things right or for 
agreeing among themselves, have been 
kept busy adding to the taxonomy of 
crises and their explanations. None of 
the solutions currently propounded can 
1Bradford De Long, "What's Wrong with Our Bloody Economies?" January u, 1998, from 
his World Wide Web page, http://econ161.berkeley.edu/; Roger C. Altman, "The Nuke of the 
90's," The New York Times Magazine, March 1,1998, p. 34. 
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really rid the system of free capital 
mobility of instability. 
Thus, while no one can disagree with 
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubins 
contention that reform of banking systems 
around the world will help, few should 
agree with him that it will eliminate the 
crises that unregulated capital flows inher 
ently generate. Nor can the abolition of the 
IMF and its lender of last resort bailouts be 
the magic bullet: there were crises before 
the writer Walter Bagehot invented this 
function for domestic central banks in the 
nineteenth century. Nor can making the 
IMF more powerful kill the crises or give it 
the nonexistent macroeconomic wisdom to 
manage them at least cost when they arise. 
In short, when we penetrate the fog 
of implausible assertions that surrounds 
the case for free capital mobility, we realize 
that the idea and the ideology of free 
trade and its benefits?and this extends 
to the continuing liberalization of trade 
in goods and financial and other services 
at the World Trade Organization?have, 
in effect, been hijacked by the proponents 
of capital mobility. They have been used 
to bamboozle us into celebrating the new 
world of trillions of dollars moving about 
daily in a borderless world, creating gigan 
tic economic gains, rewarding virtue and 
punishing profligacy. The pretty face 
presented to us is, in fact, a mask that 
hides the warts and wrinkles underneath. 
The question, then, is why the world 
has nonetheless been moving in this direc 
tion. The answer, as always, reflects ideol 
ogy and interests?that is, lobbies. The 
ideology is clearly that of markets. The 
steady move away from central planning, 
overregulation, and general overreach in 
state intervention toward letting markets 
function has now reached across many 
sectors and countries. This is indeed all to 
the good and promises worldwide pros 
perity. But this wave has also lulled many 
economists and policymakers into com 
placency about the pitfalls that certain 
markets inherently pose even when they 
were understood in the classroom. Free 
capital mobility is just one example of this 
unwarranted attitude. Indeed, Stanley 
Fischer, the deputy managing director of 
the imf, admitted in a February appearance 
on the Charlie Rose show on PBS that he 
had underestimated the probability of such 
crises arising in a world of capital mobility. 
But interests have also played a central 
role. Wall Street s financial firms have obvi 
ous self-interest in a world of free capital 
mobility since it only enlarges the arena in 
which to make money. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Wall Street has put its pow 
erful oar into the turbulent waters of Wash 
ington political lobbying to steer in this 
direction. Thus, when testifying before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
South Asia in March 1995, right after the 
Mexican peso crisis, I was witness to the 
grilling of Undersecretary of Commerce 
Jeffrey E. Garten on why Indias financial 
system was not fully open to U.S. firms. 
To his credit, Garten said that this was not 
exactly a propitious time for the United 
States to pressure India in this direction. 
Then again, Wall Street has exceptional 
clout with Washington for the simple 
reason that there is, in the sense of a power 
elite ? la C. Wright Mills, a definite net 
working of like-minded luminaries 
among the powerful institutions?Wall 
Street, the Treasury Department, the 
State Department, the imf, and the 
World Bank most prominent among 
them. Secretary Rubin comes from Wall 
Street; Altman went from Wall Street to 
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President Bushs Secretary of the Treasury, 
is back in finance as well; Ernest Stern, 
who has served as acting president of the 
World Bank, is now managing director 
of J.R Morgan; James Wolfensohn, an 
investment banker, is now president of 
the World Bank. One could go on. 
This powerful network, which may 
aptly, if loosely, be called the Wall 
Street-Treasury complex, is unable to look 
much beyond the interest of Wall Street, 
which it equates with the good of the 
world. Thus the imf has been relentlessly 
propelled toward embracing the goal of 
capital account convertibility. The Mexican 
bailout of 1994 was presented as necessary, 
which was true. But so too was the flip 
side, that the Wall Street investors had 
to be bailed out as well, which was not. 
Surely other policy instruments, such as 
a 
surcharge, could have been deployed 
simultaneously to punish Wall Street for 
its mistakes. Even in the current Asian 
crisis, particularly in South Korea, U.S. 
banks could all have been forced to the 
bargaining table, absorbing far larger 
losses than they did, but they were cush 
ioned by the imf acting virtually as a 
lender of first, rather than last, resort. 
And despite the evidence of the inher 
ent risks of free capital flows, the Wall 
Street-Treasury complex is currently pro 
ceeding on the self-serving assumption that 
the ideal world is indeed one of free capital 
flows, with the imf and its bailouts at the 
apex in a role that guarantees its survival 
and enhances its status. But the 
weight of 
evidence and the force of logic point in the 
opposite direction, toward restraints on 
capital flows. It is time to shift the burden 
of proof from those who oppose to those 
who favor liberated capital.? 
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